lunes, 14 de abril de 2014

La Uniformidad del Derecho Maritimo, ¿Leyenda o Mito? Por Jose Ma. Alcantara




LA UNIFORMIDAD DEL DERECHO MARÍTIMO, ¿LEYENDA O MITO?.

Desde los inicios del CMI en 1897 la Uniformidad en el Derecho Marítimo ha sido un objetivo fundacional, si no el principal. Prácticamente todos los Estatutos de las Asociaciones Nacionales de Derecho Marítimo recogieron fielmente ese mandato de promover la unificación de las leyes marítimas en el mundo. Las Naciones Unidas (la UNCTAD, IMO, UNCITRAL, destacadamente, lo continuaron. El Instituto Iberoamericano, en su fundación en 1987 en La Rábida (Huelva) recogió el mismo objetivo para el ámbito de los países iberoamericanos. A nivel internacional, en el sector marítimo mundial, el fin máximo de la UNIFORMIDAD de las legislaciones marítimas constituye un propósito esencial para la búsqueda no sólo de unas mismas leyes marítimas entre los países (unificación) sino, más aún, entre esos países y sus aplicaciones internas de no-extranjería (uniformidad). Ha llegado a figurar como base de interpretación de muchos Convenios Internacionales Marítimos (p.ej., las Reglas de Hamburgo, la Convención TM 1980, la Convención OTI 1991, las Reglas de Rotterdam, etc.). Realmente,”uniformidad” es una expresión insustituible e indispensable en todas las alocuciones de los dirigentes de las principales organizaciones marítimas en la actualidad. Y es un objetivo deseado por toda la comunidad marítima internacional. Es la “leyenda” del Derecho Marítimo.

Empero, los resultados de la búsqueda de la Uniformidad son muy desiguales 117 años después. Se logró la firma y entrada en vigor de un número importante de Convenios de Bruselas (promovidos por el CMI) y de las NN.UU. (promovidos por la IMO, UNCTAD, UNCITRAL, ILO y UNESCO), afectando a materias de Derecho Privado y Público, y la lista es amplia y exhaustiva. Sin embargo:

- no existe acuerdo sobre los métodos para lograr la Uniformidad (Convenios Internacionales, Reglas voluntarias, Leyes-Modelo, Derecho de Formularios, Recomendaciones de Organizaciones Marítimas,lex mercatoria), y las iniciativas no caminan juntas.

- los Convenios Internacionales tienen pocas ratificaciones y un éxito muy desigual.

- los Gobiernos prestan consentimiento para la firma de los Convenios Internacionales pero no los ratifican para conseguir la entrada en vigor de los mismos.

- hay defectos de coordinación y de falta de revisión entre los Convenios Internacionales.

- se producen muy diferentes interpretaciones en la aplicación judicial de las normas de los Convenios.

- no existe, apenas, a nivel internacional una metodología o una política de explicación y de aclaración de los Convenios Internacionales que entran en vigor para los Gobiernos firmantes.

- los intereses de los grupos Navieros impiden que algunos Convenios Internacionales progresen.

- los largos períodos de gestación de un Convenio Internacional suelen producir normas “de consenso”, más que de “buen Derecho”, y se forman regulaciones internacionales demasiado complejas y hasta incoherentes de difícil comprensión y posterior aplicación.


- no hay criterios uniformes sobre los requisitos de entrada en vigor de los Convenios  ni sobre el alcance de las reservas.

- los primeros Convenios Marítimos sobre una materia no son utilizados como base para unificación con otros posteriores.

- sobre todo, no se ha asimilado aún la intervención del Derecho Publico en la actividad marítima.

Ante los problemas enunciados, y otros más, no sirven de mucho las “campañas pro ratificación” de Convenios en paquete (de hasta 11) promovidas y lanzadas de forma conjunta por organizaciones internacionales varias (CMI, ICS, ISF) ya que no se abordan los problemas de fondo ni se inician contactos útiles con los Gobiernos.

Los resultados no son muy alentadores:

- De 192 Estados miembros de las NN.UU., en la actualidad, muy pocas Convenciones Marítimas han alcanzado un éxito general de adopción. Solamente, las de Derecho del Mar, Montego Bay, 1982 con 173 ratificaciones, la de la Organización Marítima Internacional (OMI) 1948 con 171 y el Convenio SOLAS 1974 con 163.

- Los Convenios de Derecho Público tuvieron mucha más aceptación que los de Derecho Privado en el siglo XX y parte del XXI, lo que indica la mayor preocupación de los Gobiernos por la Seguridad de la Vida Humana en el Mar, la Seguridad en la Navegación y la Protección del Medio Ambiente. Así, los Convenios de Alta Mar 1958, del Mar Territorial y la Zona Contigua 1958, de la Plataforma Continental 1958, de Líneas de Carga 1966/88, de Medidas de Tonelaje 1969, MARPOL 73/78, SUA 1988, Reglamento de Abordajes 1972, INMARSAT 1976, Facilitación del Tráfico marítimo 1965, todos ellos con más de 100 ratificaciones.

- Las grandes catástrofes por accidentes con vertidos de hidrocarburos en el mar produjeron una máxima concienciación gubernamental a favor de la uniformidad de una respuesta internacional. Así, el CLC69 con 110 ratificaciones, el PROL 92 (CLC 92) con 138, el BUNKER 2001 con 73 y el FUND92 con 122 reflejan esa preocupación y suponen el mayor ejemplo de uniformidad en material de Responsabilidad por daños al medio marino. Es decir, que sólo el ejemplo de los desastres ecológicos fue capaz de movilizar un esfuerzo mundial aceptable en torno a una legislación fundamentada en la responsabilidad objetiva, aunque limitada y no extensiva a daños consecuenciales o remotos. No obstante, desde 1996 no pudo progresar la Convención SNP de Londres, que había sido adoptada sólo por 13 países en 2010, lo que provocó un PROL de flexibilización que se espera logre un número inmediato de ratificaciones.

- En Derecho Privado el protagonismo único hasta 1978 fue del CMI, mediante los llamados Convenios de Bruselas. Así, el de mayor éxito fue el de Responsabilidad por Abordaje 1910, con 91 ratificaciones, siguiéndole el de Embargo Preventivo de Buques 1952, con 75. Una modesta aceptación tuvieron los de Jurisdicción Civil para casos de Abordaje 1952, con 66; el de Jurisdicción Penal para casos de Abordaje 1952, con 68; Limitación de Responsabilidad de Armadores 1957, con 48; el de Salvamento 1910, con 64; el de Pasajeros y Equipajes 1974, con 34; y el de Privilegio e Hipotecas 1926, con 28. Aunque su mayor logro fueron las Reglas de la Haya 1924, con 91 ratificaciones; el PROL de Visby 1968 con 30.

- La labor del CMI no fue sustituida con mayor éxito por las NN.UU. desde 1978, en materias de Derecho Privado. Así, el Convenio de Embargo Preventivo de Buques 1999 sólo ha logrado entrar en vigor con 10 ratificaciones actuales; el Convenio de Privilegios e Hipotecas 1993, con sólo 17; las Reglas de Hamburgo 1978, con 34 ratificaciones; el de Budapest 2000, con sólo 14; el Convenio de Salvamento Marítimo de Londres 1989, con sólo 61 (menos que su predecesor de 1910); el de Limitación de Responsabilidad por Reclamaciones Marítimas de Londres 1976, con 60 y su PROL 1996, con 46; el de Nairobi 2007 sobre Remoción de Restos aun no ha entrado en vigor, no habiendo pasado de 5 ratificaciones. Y las Reglas de Rotterdam 2008 tampoco han entrado en vigor, contando con 3 ratificaciones hasta la fecha.

- Las NN.UU. tuvieron su logro más importante, para efectos de Derecho Marítimo con la Convención de New York sobre reconocimiento y ejecución de sentencias arbitrales extranjeras 1958, con hasta 150 ratificaciones. También, el Convenio OIT sobre el Trabajo Marítimo 2006, entró en vigor el 20 Agosto 2013 con 50 ratificaciones ya, lo que anticipa una máxima aceptación.

- Puede observarse que una serie de Convenios no vieron la luz de su vigencia internacional como fueron el Convenio de Polizones y Pasajeros Clandestinos 1957, el de Transporte Multimodal, Ginebra 1980, el de Responsabilidad de Operadores de Terminales Internacionales 1991, el Convenio de Transporte Combinado (The Tokio Rules) 1969, el de Responsabilidad de Operadores de Buques Nucleares 1962, el de Responsabilidad Civil en materia de Transporte marítimo de Materiales Nucleares 1971, el de Privilegios e Hipotecas de 1967, el de Registro de Derechos en relación con Buques en Construcción 1967, el de Condiciones para el Registro de Buques 1986, y el de Artefactos Móviles Costa-afuera de 1977. No existió nunca proyecto alguno de Convención sobre Construcción Naval, sobre Sociedades de Clasificación, sobre Pólizas de Fletamento, sobre Seguros Marítimos, sobre Financiación de Buques, sobre Remolque Marítimo, sobre Practicaje a Buques, sobre Compraventa de Buques ni sobre Contratos de Explotación de Buques. Con éllo, en su conjunto, un gran territorio del Derecho Marítimo privado permanece dentro del ámbito contractual bajo el régimen de “freedom of contract” y alejado del proyecto de Uniformidad que se lleva a cabo mediante Convenios Internacionales Marítimos. El CMI, entre 1910 y 1978, mediante la serie de Bruselas preparó hasta 28 Convenios pero logró llevar a vigencia internacional sólo 10, mientras que dedicó empeño y trabajo a ensayos no-convencionales llamados “guías orientadoras”, ”principios de regulación”, ”reglas de liquidación”, ”reglas uniformes” y “ley modelo nacional” (así, Reglas Uniformes para Conocimientos de Embarque Electrónicos 1990, Reglas Uniformes sobre Cartas de Porte nominativas 1990, Voy-Lay-Rules 1993, Reglas para Valoración de daños por Abordaje 1988, Reglas York-Amberes 1994, Guías orientadoras sobre Daños por Contaminación de Hidrocarburos 1994, Ley Modelo sobre Piratería y Actos de Violencia Marítima 2001, Principios de Conducta para Sociedades de Clasificación 1998, Modelos de Cláusulas Contractuales para uso en Acuerdos entre Sociedades de Clasificación y Gobiernos, y entre Sociedades de Clasificación y Armadores, 1999; y más recientemente, Reglas Uniformes para la Constitución del Fondo de Limitación de Responsabilidad 2008, y Reglas Uniformes para uso en las Ventas Judiciales de Buques, previstas para aprobación en 2014. De este modo el CMI, cuyo liderazgo en el sendero convencional cesó en 1978 con la entrada de las NN.UU., en la actualidad trabaja como Consultor de NN.UU. para la elaboración de Convenios Marítimos pero, al mismo tiempo, combina esa primigenia misión con otros métodos de unificación, de carácter voluntario, que sustraen materias destinables a Convenios Marítimos y dispersan el esfuerzo internacional por la Uniformidad.

- También por la difícil transición CMI-NN.UU. el sector marítimo mundial se escindió entre intereses de cargadores y de armadores, dándose lugar a tensiones que han producido un verdadero caos, p.ej., en la esfera del transporte de mercancías. Efectivamente, en un campo que constituye más del 50% del Derecho Marítimo privado en la actualidad conviven hasta 9 regimenes de responsabilidad diferentes y de limitación (países que han adoptado las Reglas de la Haya solamente, países que adoptaron las Reglas Haya-Visby; países que adoptaron Haya-Visby-SDR, países de las Reglas de Hamburgo, países que tienen sus leyes nacionales, países que instalaron un régimen regional uniforme combinado Haya-Hamburgo, países que adoptaron el Convenio TM1980 por ley interna, países de miembros de FIATA que aplican las Reglas CCI-UNCTAD sobre Transporte Multimodal y países que no tienen regulación alguna). La UNCITRAL, junto con el CMI, ha buscado poner un orden a dicho caos por medio de las llamadas Reglas de Rotterdam 2008, que aún no han entrado en vigor. Es difícil que, si entran en vigor, alcancen el número de casi 100 ratificaciones de las Reglas de la Haya, y éllo explica por qué no avanza el proceso de vigencia de las Reglas de Rotterdam. Si éstas entran en vigor el cuadro desuniforme se agravará porque se añadirá, a los ya mencionados, un nuevo régimen de Responsabilidad del Porteador (marítimo y puerta-puerta) ya que todo país que ratifique las Reglas de Rotterdam habrá de denunciar los Convenios de la Haya-Visby o de Hamburgo, según el caso y el mundo se dividirá aún más, salvo que las Reglas de Rotterdam consigan el nivel de aceptación general de, p.ej., las Reglas de La Haya, lo que es altamente improbable.

El anterior panorama, que aflora un estado deficitario evidente en la unificación del Derecho marítimo privado, nos provocará unas REFLEXIONES sobre: a) el modelo de legislación marítima que debe servir de eje al movimiento uniformador; b) el papel del Derecho Publico en  ese modelo, y c) la verdadera dimensión de la cesta uniformadora en el siglo XXI.

a) Podemos compartir la idea, simple e histórica, de que el Derecho Marítimo del siglo XXI no puede ser, no es el mismo, que el de los siglos XIX y XX. La ciencia, la tecnología naval y portuaria, la evolución del tráfico y los cambios sociales son determinantes para enfocar la ordenación y regulación del tráfico marítimo con un criterio cambiante y de progreso evolutivo. Así como el Contenedor marcó desde la década de los 60, siglo XX, dos eras bien diferenciadas en el transporte de mercancías, un número de fenómenos similares nos ofrecen una realidad marítima diferente hoy. Los avances de la construcción naval, con sus buques “green”, doble-casco, los portacontenedores de gran capacidad de más de 12.000 TEUS, los OBOS, los Ferries Ro-Ro, etc.; los avances en logística portuaria; la ingente amenaza de los transportes de mercancías peligrosas y de sustancias nocivas, con recientes desastres ecológicos como el del “Prestige”, la simplificación de documentos (EDI, por vía electrónica) y de trámites, y muchos más, son factores que obligan a adaptar al Derecho Marítimo a nuestro tiempo, a la década 2015-2025. Esto nos parece indiscutible.

Pero no parece que tal mentalidad gobierne los criterios de los legisladores del siglo XXI que, p.ej. con motivo del Convenio de 2008 Reglas de Rotterdam, tomaron como fundamento de la Responsabilidad del Porteador el régimen del Convenio de La Haya de 1924. Las iniciativas convencionales no están coordinadas y debiendo proceder de las NN.UU. no siempre persiguen los objetivos-madre sentados por la OMI: seguridad de la vida humana en el mar, seguridad de la navegación y protección del medio ambiente marino, como son los casos del Convenio de Nairobi 2007, sobre Remoción de Restos, que no se aplicará en aguas territoriales, las Reglas de Rotterdam de 2008 que ofrecen espacios desregulados (opting-in, opting-out), el Convenio de Embargo Preventivo de Buques 1999 que no incluyó consideración alguna sobre la obstrucción de buques embargados y abandonados en puerto, dejando de forma facultativa la exigencia de fianzas para el embargante. La abolición del crédito marítimo privilegiado del “proveedor de buques” y la no inclusión de los gastos de salvamento sin éxito (“safety net” del Convenio de Salvamento 1989) en el Convenio de Privilegios e Hipotecas 1993 no fueron medidas realistas, como tampoco lo fue la eliminación del crédito del “suministrador de combustible” en los supuestos de compra por el Fletador en el Convenio de Embargo Preventivo de Buques 1999. La ficción jurídico-procesal de la “canalización“ de responsabilidad hacia el Naviero propietario del buque causante en los CLC92 y SNP96 (PROL 2010), a diferencia del BUNKER2001, constituyen hoy día un ejemplo de anacronismo que persiste desde el “Torrey Canyon”. Por éllo el cuerpo de Derecho Marítimo con el que hoy contamos no es un cuerpo integrado y coherente, sino una relación fragmentada de propósitos de distinta fuente, marca y signo. El Derecho Marítimo Privado habita aún, y muy profundamente, en las aguas del “freedom of contract”, alimentado por la jurisprudencia europea en materia de contratos estándar y doctrina de los grandes riesgos (Convención de Lugano). No se ha avanzado en los derroteros de sumisión al Derecho Público (como sucede con el casi inatacable principio del derecho de limitación de la responsabilidad del Naviero), ni se ha abordado las concomitancias e interferencias con normas de ordenación y seguridad, Derecho de la Competencia, regulaciones portuarias, normativas fiscales y Registros abiertos, eliminación de buques subestándar y seguros marítimos, etc., etc., es decir no se ha iniciado aún una necesaria visión de conjunto a partir del buque, que con el transporte multimodal ha convertido al Derecho marítimo en parcialmente terrestre (y no la parcialidad marítima  de excepción, como ensayan las Reglas de Rotterdam). Tenemos un Derecho Marítimo diferente, que en el siglo XXI tiene carácter integrado y multidisciplinar. Lo que la OIT ha demostrado con su Convenio de 2006 sobre el Trabajo Marino, que penetra todas las ocupaciones que envuelve el tráfico, y ha sorprendido a todos por su diafanidad, no obstante su prudencia en cuanto a vis obligatoria.

Es necesario construir y preparar el “Derecho Marítimo del siglo XXI”. De una manera y con un enfoque coherente, que represente tanto los institutos jurídicos vigentes aún como los que necesita el tráfico moderno en función de unos objetivos definidos y globales. Hemos de abandonar la política de listados de temas o de materias aún no tocados, porque no todas las novedades han de ser objeto de uniformidad internacional, y hemos de emprender el debate del tipo de Leyes Marítimas que el mundo precisa con carácter internacional uniforme para un comercio y una navegación más seguros y más respetuosos con el medio ambiente. Será cuestión prioritaria analizar y debatir si las otras vías de búsqueda de uniformidad, como son las Reglas voluntarias, las leyes-modelo, el Derecho de formularios y hasta la lex mercatoria han de convivir, de forma alternativa, con los Convenios Internacionales o si la solución del Tratado Internacional ha de ser escogida como preferible y dominante. En el seno del CMI el “Planning Committee” es encargado de sugerir los temas y las cuestiones jurídicas que deben estudiarse internamente para llegar a una propuesta de ley modelo, de reglas voluntarias o de Convenio Internacional. Esa labor de estudio no se da, con carácter regular y permanente, en la OMI ni en la UNCITRAL, por lo que las propuestas que vienen del CMI tienen gran valor y casi único señuelo. De ahí que parezca oportuno que el CMI inicie el gran debate sobre el “Derecho Marítimo del siglo XXI” e invite al mismo a las Organizaciones Marítimas y, por supuesto, a los órganos de las NN.UU. Será, a nuestro entender, imprescindible la dirección de un “High Standing Legal ISC” que debería velar por el acercamiento de las instituciones marítimas del Common law y del Derecho Civil, orientar los fines de toda reforma de anteriores Convenios, que deberán ser revisados, y del estudio de normativas integradoras de los Derechos Publico y Privado con un denominador lineal que no podría ser otro que el bien común de la Humanidad y la prosecución de los objetivos destinados a la creación de un marco jurídico de “orden público internacional marítimo”, que sirviera de base de contraste y validez para toda ulterior normativa y que, sobre todo, sirviera para una mejor interpretación, deseablemente también uniforme, del Derecho Marítimo convencional por los Tribunales de Justicia y Árbitros que hayan de conocer de las controversias.
         En la Universidad los programas docentes habituales aún nos enseñan una faz sistematizada y fragmentada del Derecho Maritimo,en formato de “piece-meal” o de “menú a la carte”.El Buque y su naturaleza;la propiedad del buque;el contrato de construcción naval;el Naviero ,el Capitan y los auxiliares;la finaciación de buques,los Privilegios y la Hipoteca naval,el Embargo Preventivo de buques;los Contratos de Explotacion de buques(arrendamiento y fletamento);el Contrato de Transporte Maritimo y el Transporte Multimodal;los Accidentes en la Mar,el abordaje,la varada,otras averías,el salvamento maritimo,la Averia Gruesa;el contrato de Remolque y de Practicaje;la Contaminación marina;las operaciones portuarias,los contratos de agencia maritima,estiba y manipulación,el deposito en Terminales de carga;la Limitación de Responsabilidad del Naviero;los Seguros Maritimos;Remoción de restos y hallazgos en el Mar;Jurisdicción y Arbitraje.Con notables variantes gracias al genio y espiritu innovador de ciertos ensayistas y docentes,los contenidos del Derecho Maritimo privado se revelan de forma segregada e imparten sin establecer interrelación con otras disciplinas que intervienen a diario en el tráfico y sin acometer una vinculación interna de todos los elementos,reales y personales,en los hechos que componen el comercio maritimo.Ese Derecho Maritimo “clásico” suele ser tomado como fuente de inspiración para la redacción de Leyes Maritimas en países varios. Un accidente por corrimiento de la carga con resultado de zozobra del buque y daños a personas y al cargamento no se puede explicar sin un enfoque en profundidad de la misma etapa de construcción,de la intervención de la Sociedad Clasificadora,del estado de conservación y de navegabilidad del buque,de los controles de inspección por el Estado Rector del Puerto,de las condiciones de empleo de la tripulación,de las operaciones de carga y estiba,de la vigilancia a bordo,de los posibles auxilios y de la actuación de los Seguros,entre otros prismas de análisis.

Así, en cierto modo, el Derecho Marítimo Internacional habría de hacerse unívoco y univalente para lograr ser auténticamente uniforme, pero propuestas polivalentes, mixtas imperativas-dispositivas, inconexas con otras implicaciones jurídicas, novedosas que se quedan en lugares baldíos, proliferación de reglas voluntarias, etc. y otros ejemplos de dispersión no ayudan ni se encaminan al fin de la Uniformidad, aunque se hagan grandes convocatorias al efecto. Necesitamos un MODELO de legislación marítima de validez internacional que pueda ser uniformado por países que entienden no sólo los contenidos sino que aceptan comprometerse con los objetivos, como sucede, p.ej., con los Convenios CTM 2006  y SNP96/2010.

b) El papel del Derecho Público se nos antoja que es hoy indiscutible. La realidad trágica de los accidentes marítimos ha abierto el camino de esa intervención desde 1914 durante cien años.

Los grandes accidentes ocurridos en el mar han producido la preocupación y actuación de los Estados a nivel internacional, es decir, a través de la OMI  a favor del interés y salud de los ciudadanos. El desarrollo de esta intervención pública, por medio de instrumentos internacionales de Derecho Público de carácter disuasorio, preventivo y sancionador ha sido imparable en el último siglo y esa intervención del Estado se presenta hoy como una garantía de protección de la vida humana en el mar y del entorno marino de naturaleza imprescindible.

Así, del hundimiento del “TITANIC” emergió el primer convenio SOLAS, Londres 1914. Del “TORREY CANYON” en 1967 surgieron los Convenios destinados a mitigar la contaminación del mar por vertidos de hidrocarburos: el CLC 69, al Convenio del Fondo 1971, el Convenio sobre intervención en Alta Mar en casos de accidentes 1969, el Convenio sobre prevención de vertidos 1972, Convenio MARPOL 1973/78, Convenio SOLAS 1974. De los desastres del “OLYMPIC BRAVERY”, 1976, y “AMOCO CADIZ”, 1978, salen el Convenio STCW 1978  y el CLC-PROT 1984. De la catástrofe del “TANIO”, en 1980, resulta el Convenio de Londres sobre el Salvamento Marítimo 1989. Del “HERALD OF FREE ENTERPRISE”, 1987, las normas de seguridad en los buques de pasaje RO-RO. Del famoso “EXXON VALDEZ”, 1989, nace la OPA 1990 norteamericana, el Convenio OPRC 1990, los CLC-PROT y FUND-PROT 1992 Y EL SCTW 1995. Del “AEGEAN SEA”, “BRAER” y “SEA EMPRESS”, resultan los LLMC y HNS 1996, el Código ISM (SOLAS) 1998 y el BUNKERS 2001. De los sucesos del 11/9 y del hundimiento del “NIEMBURG", se llega al Código ISPS (SOLAS) 2003. Del “PRESTIGE”, en noviembre 2002, nace el tercer suplemento al FUND-92 o SUPERFUND. Del “ESTONIA” y “AL-SALAM BOCACCIO 98”, finalmente se concluye el ATHENS-PROT 2004 relativo a Pasajeros y su Equipaje. En Julio 2007, en Nairobi, el Convenio sobre Remoción de Restos naufragados. La OMI culminó en 2010 en Hong-Kong un Convenio regulador del RECICLAJE DE BUQUES para controlar una actividad de desguace de buques en la que se producen fuertes pérdidas de vidas humanas.

A estos Convenios hay que añadir los relativos a la protección de los recursos marinos y a la explotación del subsuelo marino y la plataforma continental: UNCLOS I y II. Y nuevos instrumentos como los PROT 2005 al Convenio para la represión de actos ilícitos contra la Seguridad de la navegación marítima y de las plataformas fijas emplazadas en la plataforma continental. Y no puede olvidarse el Convenio de París 2001,  de la UNESCO, sobre protección del Patrimonio Cultural Sumergido.

Este abundante cuerpo normativo internacional sustentado, principalmente, por las NN.UU. ha de complementarse, por vía de normas de desarrollo, por un inmenso receptáculo de leyes regionales supranacionales y leyes internas de los Estados, con lo que las Autoridades Públicas de los Estados miembros ejercen el poder coercitivo de cumplimiento de las normativas. Los medios de vigilancia, ordenación, guardacostas, formación, control marítimo, financiación, autorización y concesión, y de régimen sancionador son hoy elementos necesarios para la consecución práctica de un Derecho Marítimo responsable ante una actividad de tráfico de personas y cosas en el medio marino, que con frecuencia se torna peligrosa.


Con el primero de los Convenios SOLAS la comunidad internacional se propuso proteger la vida humana en el mar, es decir, las condiciones del hombre a bordo de los buques, la evitación de accidentes y el salvamento de vidas en casos de peligro destinando un largo proceso normativo a la seguridad a bordo, que aún continúa con capítulos añadidos y modificaciones al SOLAS 74. Las condiciones de seguridad en el buque y en la navegación, sobre todo en los transportes de productos peligrosos y nocivos (hidrocarburos, sustancias, carburantes y cargamentos nucleares) ha sido máximo objeto de los Estados entre los años 1969 y 2007 a través de la OMI y a nivel regional/nacional. La protección y seguridad del medio ambiente marino es otro objetivo definidor de las iniciativas internacionales a partir de los grandes desastres ecológicos. Iniciada con el “Torrey Canyon”,  hoy día no es concebible una legislación internacional marítima que no respete el medioambiente frente a los riesgos de la navegación .

El otro gran objetivo, surgido a partir del 11/9, es el de la protección de personas en, y en relación, con el buque frente a riesgos de terrorismo y actos criminales, que produce el nuevo capítulo 12 del SOLAS conocido como Código ISPS y conduce a múltiples iniciativas sobre control y registro de contenedores en los puertos. Así como, en la Conferencia de Londres de 10-14 Octubre 2005 sobre revisión de los tratados SUA, se adoptan dos Protocolos sobre la represión de actos ilícitos contra la seguridad de la navegación marítima y contra la seguridad de las plataformas fijas situadas en la plataforma continental.

Estos grandes objetivos internacionales de seguridad de la vida humana, seguridad de la navegación y protección del ecosistema marino constituyen los parámetros fundamentales de toda la producción legislativa marítima internacional desde la segunda mitad del siglo XX, así como en el actual. La labor de la OMI ha sido incesante e incansable en la persecución de tales fines. Su Comité de Seguridad Marítima, conocido por MSC, lidera la preparación de potenciales acuerdos internacionales, que se han venido alcanzando en materias conexas, como p.ej.:

-       El Convenio de 1979 y sus enmiendas 2004 sobre búsqueda y salvamento marítimos (SAR).

-       Código de formación, titulación y guardia para la gente de mar, enmiendas 2004.

-       Protocolo 1988 y enmiendas 2004 al Convenio sobre Líneas de carga 1966.

-       Enmiendas 2004 al Código Internacional de seguridad para naves de gran velocidad 1994.

-       Enmiendas 2004 al Código Internacional para la aplicación de procedimientos de ensayo de exposición al fuego (Código PEF).

-       Enmiendas 2004 al Código Internacional para la construcción y equipo de buques que transporten gases licuados a granel (Código CIG).

-       Código internacional de gestión de la seguridad operacional y la prevención de la contaminación (Código ISM o IGS), enmiendas 2004.

Y otras.

El flujo de disposiciones, de obligado cumplimiento, es de gran magnitud y supone para los Estados, tanto del país de abanderamiento como del rector del puerto, un notorio esfuerzo de exigencia y vigilancia a través de su ordenamiento administrativo interno, con carácter coercitivo-sancionador.

No obstante, no tenemos aún un BUQUE SEGURO, ni un BUQUE ECOLÓGICO, ni se han alcanzado logros en áreas de construcción naval, clasificación de buques, gestión y transparencia en la empresa naviera, coberturas obligatorias de seguros, etc., en los que indefectiblemente el Derecho Publico habrá de penetrar a fin de llevar a buen término los indicados objetivos, todos ellos exigidos por el bien común de la humanidad.

La uniformidad del Derecho Marítimo ha sido una gran frase  desde hace más de un siglo al efecto de expresar el deseo de disponer de leyes iguales o semejantes en los países que forman el concierto internacional. Al cabo de una rica y copiosa experiencia, los resultados son casi dramáticos y a la vista están. No es fácil, ni a veces posible (por  ej. EE.UU), lograr una misma voluntad de consenso internacional. Menos aún parece que lo es conseguir la ratificación y posterior puesta en vigencia interna de los Convenios marítimos, con la lógica denuncia de otros anteriores que resultarían incompatibles. La uniformidad a nivel internacional sólo está hoy sostenida por la legislación de interés público en pro de la seguridad marítima y protección del medioambiente, por lo que la OMI y los grandes bloques regionales, como la UE y la ASEAN, son sus verdaderos impulsores. Es así que el Derecho Público, o la intervención del Estado en el tráfico marítimo, se convierte en auténtico motor de la uniformidad jurídica.

c) Pero, uniformidad ¿en torno a qué?. Ya creemos superado el afán de producir leyes iguales cortadas por un mismo patrón, porque los egoísmos nacionales lo impiden y no se consigue mucho más que un deficiente “law of compromise”. Quizás el futuro nos deba reunir en torno a realidades esenciales. Así, debería existir uniformidad en torno al BUQUE SEGURO Y ECOLÓGICO, interviniendo a tal fin desde los procesos de construcción y clasificación hasta los de su desaparición y reciclaje; en torno a LA EMPRESA MARÍTIMA SEGURA RESPONSABLE, regulando a favor de la transparencia de titularidad, del registro de actividades y cargas, del intercambio de información entre aseguradores, de la prevención privada selectiva, de los controles sobre “tripulaciones de conveniencia”, etc.; en torno a la cooperación internacional sobre PROCEDIMIENTOS DE CONTROL E INSPECCION de buques substandard, unificando sistemas de actuación y persecución; en torno a LA PREVENCIÓN E INVESTIGACIÓN DE ACCIDENTES MARÍTIMOS, favoreciendo patrones internacionales de encuesta y de planes de contingencia y monitorización; y últimamente, en torno al TRANSPORTE MULTIMODAL Y LA LOGISTICA EN LOS PUERTOS Y CENTROS DE DISTRIBUCION DE MERCANCIAS, que las perspectivas de mayor fluidez de intercambios de tráfico y de mayor conectividad parecen imponer a partir de extraordinarios desarrollos como la ampliación del Canal de Panama. Estos aspectos, que entendemos son  uniformables, responden a aquéllos objetivos sobre los cuales la comunidad internacional de países con intereses marítimos podría estar dispuesta a ponerse de acuerdo.

Lo demás, el largo camino por alcanzar un mundo de leyes marítimas uniformes en el Derecho Privado es  poco realista, aunque los esfuerzos en tal sentido parezcan encomiables y respetables, sobre todo partiendo de frentes alejados y dispares, todo lo cual ha dado lugar a una desuniformidad de interpretación de los Convenios Marítimos por los Tribunales de los distintos países, como puede observarse a través del análisis de jurisprudencia, mediante database, realizado en el seno del CMI dirigido por el Prof. Francesco Berlingieri para 10 Convenios en el periodo 2000-2006.

De ahí que concluyamos que la Uniformidad del Derecho Marítimo pase por horas bajas y que pueda pasar de “leyenda” a  “mito” si no se racionaliza el empeño, se simplifica el objetivo y, sobre todo, se dota de un modelo al proceso pensando más en el tráfico marítimo moderno y en las preocupaciones lógicas de los Gobiernos que en alcanzar y trabajar a machamartillo consensos sobre temas que, por carecer de importancia prioritaria, son muy sensibles a la discrepancia de intereses y opiniones. La desuniformidad avanza más deprisa que la uniformidad y deberían economizarse los largos periodos de gestación de Convenios (10-15 años), mediante una mayor confluencia previa de objetivos y de vocaciones comunes en torno al Derecho Marítimo. Esa confluencia, que incluiría una labor de revisión y limpieza de normativas preexistentes, habría de tener lugar en el CMI y las NN.UU., con la colaboración de la BIMCO, ICS, ISF, ICC, IUMI, IIDM, etc., etc., es decir de los organismos interesados que probablemente necesitan más un liderazgo y una propuesta clara de legislación marítima que una llamada a hacer campaña por la ratificación de “paquetes” de Convenios Internacionales Marítimos.


Jose M. Alcántara
Panama y Madrid.

 Por

viernes, 14 de febrero de 2014

COMUNIDAD MARITIMA CLAMA POR LA ADOPCIÓN DE "PUERTOS DE REFUGIO". World Maritime News




Shipowners, Salvors and Insurers – through their respective trade associations – have jointly called for the prompt and proper implementation of international measures to provide a Place of Refuge for stricken vessels, following a series of incidents where casualty vessels have been delayed in accessing a safe harbour.
Shipowners, Salvors and Insurers Call for Adoption of IMO Places of Refuge Guidelines
The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) says that it has noted “with dismay” the refusal by some coastal States to make places of refuge available, thereby risking lives and the environment even after the high profile cases of the Stolt Valor and the MSC Flaminia in 2012. And the plight of the Maritime Maisie presently off the coast of Japan has brought this subject back into sharp focus. The 44,000 dwt chemical tanker is being held at sea by six tugs after a collision and fire on 29 December 2013. The cargo fire has now been extinguished through the efforts of the salvors in the face of difficult conditions at sea.
The vessel has been seeking a place of refuge in either the Republic of Korea or Japan for more than a month. The salvors have indicated that it is a priority to take the vessel to calm waters to manage the remaining cargo in a safe manner and so to minimize potential damage to the environment.
The International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI), the International Salvage Union, (ISU) and ICS all recognise that the issue of Places of Refuge for casualty vessels is sensitive and that the risk of pollution from casualties cannot be completely removed. They also recognise that decisions with regard to handling casualty vessels carry political implications and may impact coastal communities.
At the same time, failure to offer a suitable Place of Refuge may prevent successful salvage intervention and therefore allow a casualty’s condition to worsen and ultimately lead to pollution that might otherwise have been prevented, and that pollution may affect a wider area than need have been the case.
Peter Hinchliffe, ICS Secretary General, said: “Guidance on the handling of requests for places of refuge was agreed at IMO but often when a case arises the coastal states concerned take a ‘not in my backyard’ attitude. This is in marked contrast to attitudes to aircraft in need of assistance. This current case shows that recent lessons have simply not been learned.
Commenting on the matter, President of the ISU, Leendert Muller said: “Our members are right on the front line of this issue. Too often they are unable to follow the best course of action which is to take the casualty into shelter, which does not necessarily have to be a port. We have seen infamous cases like Castor and Prestige and more recently the MSC Flaminia and Stolt Valor and now the Maritime Maisie where our members, attending damaged vessels, experienced great difficulty in finding an authority willing to accept the casualty.
Ole Wikborg, President of the IUMI, points out: “The potential impact of environmental damage has to be reduced as much as possible and the safety of crews is paramount and we have to minimize material damage to ships and equipment. Coastal states must be able to make the best possible decision to prevent further damage following a maritime accident. Some countries have a system that seems to be functioning. IUMI is of the strong opinion that the prevailing regulations as set out, for example, by IMO and the EU are sufficient but that the necessary steps have to be taken to make the rules work.
ISU, ICS and IUMI all note the international legal context for the issue and the significant relevant legislation that is in place internationally and regionally, in particular, IMO Resolution A.949, “Guidelines on Places of Refuge for ships in need of assistance”; Resolution A.950 (23) (recommending all coastal States to establish a Maritime Assistance Service) and the 1989 Salvage Convention as well as the European Union vessel traffic monitoring and information system (Directive 2002/59/EC as amended by Directive 2009/17/EC) which prevents member States from issuing an outright refusal to provide a place of refuge and states that safety of human life and the environment are of over-riding concern.
The industry bodies do not see merit in pursuing additional international legislation which will be a lengthy process and will consume resources. Instead they will campaign for better application of, compliance with and enforcement of existing rules and guidance. ISU has already formally presented views on Places of Refuge to EU member states through the EU Commission; the issue will be raised in IMO fora this year and there will be direct engagement with the governments of individual coastal states.
In short, coastal states should be encouraged to recognise that granting a Place of Refuge to a casualty vessel may be the most appropriate course. States should establish an authority to assess each case on its merits without political interference. Such an assessment must include a visual inspection and conclude with recommendations for managing and mitigating the risk of any impact on local coastlines and communities. The assumption should be that a Place of Refuge will be granted if needed and that there should be “no rejection without inspection”.
IUMI, ICS and ISU would like to see wider adoption by coastal states of simple, robust, “single point” command and control models akin to that of the United Kingdom’s SOSREP system.

martes, 10 de diciembre de 2013

De nuestros amigos de la prestigiosa Society of Maritime Arbitrators ,Inc. (Nueva York)


THE ARBITRATOR
VOLUME 44 | NUMBER 1 | NOVEMBER 2013
SOCIETY OF MARITIME ARBITRATORS, INC.
PRESIDENT’S CORNER
Welcome to this issue of The Arbitrator. This is the first issue since I have had the privilege of being elected president of the SMA for the next two years. I can’t begin a new administration without f irst thanking Austin Dooley, my immediate predecessor, who has spent the past four years dedicated to leading our organization and being our spokesperson to the global arbitral sphere.
2013/2014 looks to be an exciting year, as we celebrate our 50th Anniversary under the leadership of past president Klaus Mordhorst, chair of the Celebration Committee. Please mark Friday November 22nd to join us at our black tie gala at the New York Yacht Club in their glorious Model Room and dance to the music of the Peter Duchin Orchestra. One of the special guests to join us will be the Honorable Loretta Preska, Chief Judge of the US District Court for the Southern District of New York. See the note from Klaus later in this issue. You will have a wonderful and memorable evening.
As part of the recognition of our 50th, on the preceding day November 21 starting at 9:00 a.m. in the Great Hall of the NYC Bar Association, we are holding what I am certain will be both a vital as well as provocative seminar based on the recently issued award in the FALCON CAR- RIER. This will be moderated by Soren Larsen, Deputy Secretary General of BIMCO. The Panel will include the arbitrators to the Award, the Honorable Judge John Martin (panel chair), Jack Berg, and Manfred Arnold, along with industry participants providing owners’ and charterers’ perspective. The discussion should be quite spirited on this most vexing topic of ship vetting. The seminar will close with remarks from Clay Maitland managing partner of International Registries, Inc., followed by a lunch hosted by the SMA. Please check our website http://www.smany. org for updates or contact our office 212-344-2400 - email us at info@smany.org.
I think we have gotten off to a fast start this year thanks in no small part to two Committee Chairs, Lucienne Bulow (Rules) and Peter Wiswell (Salvage). At our first Board meeting in September modifications to the SMA Rules
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INDEX TO THIS ISSUE
President’s Corner...........................................1 Amendments to SMA Rules ............................. 2
The New York International Arbitration
Center (“NYIAC”) ........................................... 3

Traditional Test for Safe Port/Safe Berth Applied by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit. “Due Diligence” Not Implied or Read Into the Warranty.

In Re Limitation Proceeding Of Frescati Shipping (The Athos I), 718 F.3D 184,
2013 AMC 1521 (3D Cir. 2013)....................... 4

Divided Damages in a Safe Berth Case:
The Westwood Anette, SMA 4189 (2012) ........ 5

Superstorm Sandy Resurfaces in Court ........... 6 The New York Produce Exchange ..................... 8 In Memoriam ................................................. 11 Remembrance of Jeremy J.O. Harwood ......... 11 George F. Chandler III ................................... 12 The SMA at 50!..............................................12 Editors Note .................................................. 13
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were approved as well as the changes to U.S. Open Form Salvage Agreement (Marsalv). Both of these revisions have been in the works for some time, but thanks to the determined efforts of both chairs we can now say “thank you, well done!” The new documents can be found on our website or again don’t hesitate to contact our office.
The following are the Board of Governors of the SMA and their Alternates:
BOARD 2013-2014
AMENDMENTS TO SMA RULES
The SMA has made some relatively minor amend- ments to its Arbitration Rules in three sections, effective October 23, 2013.
Section 2 of SMA Rules which relates to Consolida- tion, provided:
“Unless all parties agree to a sole Arbitrator, consolidated disputes are to be heard by a maximum of three Arbitrators to be appointed as agreed by all parties or, failing such agreement, as ordered by the Court.”
Although our rules provided that, failing agreement of the parties, a party could resort to the court for appoint- ment of a panel in a consolidated proceeding, in The Rice Company v. Precious Flowers Ltd. and The Government of Peru (12 Civ. 0497, June 5, 2012), Judge Furman of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York refused to get involved with the constitution of a panel of SMA arbitrators in a consolidated arbitration. The judge sent it back to the SMA for resolution. Section 2 has, there- fore, been amended to offer a mechanism whereby such a dispute could be settled by the SMA, more precisely by the President or Vice President of the SMA.
We have also made some minor changes in Section 21 to give some more time for claimants and respondents to learn about each other’s case prior to the first hearing. The claimant will have to submit a pre-hearing statement of its position and claim, not less than ten business days prior to the f irst hearing. The respondent should submit its preliminary statement of defense, not less than 5 business days thereafter. We also provide that a brief description of a witness’s testimony be given at least one week in ad- vance of the scheduled hearing date. A panel always has the discretion to alter time limits as provided in Section 34. We also mention that the panel retains the privilege to request supplementary briefs on issue(s) which it considers necessary or in need of clarification or further argument.
In view of the recent opening of the New York Inter- national Arbitration Center which offers state of the art technology, we decided to mention in Section 23 the pos- sibility to use video conferencing, always subject to the Panel’s discretion.
SMA Rules can be found on our website www.smany.org.
Lucienne C. Bulow
Chairman, SMA By-Laws and Rules Committee

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Elected 2013
Thomas Fox Klaus Mordhorst Robert Flynn Robert Shaw
Alternates
Jack Ring
Svend Hansen, Jr. James Hood Evangelos Venturas

Elected 2012
Lucienne Bulow Donald Frost Michael Hand Bengt Nergaard
Peter Wiswell Robert Meehan Michael Fackler Mukul Bhushan
Appointed 2013
Manfred Arnold Thomas Bradshaw
David Martowski Nigel Hawkins
With the quality and experience of the Board and Committee Chairs coupled with the youthful enthusiasm of our new members I have very high expectations for the coming year.
Jack Warfield
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THE ARBITRATOR
© 2013 The Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc.
This publication was created to provide you with current information concerning maritime arbitration; however, this publication was not necessarily prepared by persons licensed to practice law in a particular jurisdiction. The publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or other professional advice and this publication is not a substitute for the advice of an attorney. If you require legal or other expert advice, you should seek the services of a competent attorney or other professional.
THE ARBITRATOR (ISSN# 1946-1208) is issued quarterly, 4 times a year; published by The Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc., 30 Broad Street, 7th Floor, New York, NY 10004. The publication is posted on our website and the subscription is free. To join our mailing list please register your email address at http//www.smany.org.
GENERAL PHOTOCOPY NOTICE: You may reproduce any portion of the publication provided that proper attribution is included if the reproduction is published elsewhere.
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ThE NEW YORk INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CENTER (“NYIAC”)
By Lucienne Carasso Bulow1
For over a century, New York has served as a center for the resolution of maritime disputes by arbitration. The New York Produce Exchange Time Charter Party was first issued as early as November 6, 1913. Its revision in 1946 provided for arbitration of time charter disputes in New York as cited its Clause 17, although we are aware of cases going as far back as the 1880’s. This year, the SMA is celebrating its 50th anniversary of providing ser- vice to the industry. We have been extolling the virtues of New York maritime arbitration for many years, but we now have help.
Arbitration has more recently become a very popular means of settling disputes in many areas. To keep up with the expanded desire for and popularity of using alternative dispute resolution proceedings for a wide variety of in- ternational commercial disputes, leaders of the New York state and city bar associations and arbitration institutions such as the American Arbitration Association have joined forces to create a well-appointed and convenient locale in which to hold arbitrations, mediations or other meetings. With funding provided by a number of New York’s leading lawfirms,theNewYorkInternationalArbitrationCenter (NYIAC) has recently opened, to major acclaim. NYIAC is located at 150 East 42nd Street, in a landmark structure (the former headquarters building of the Socony-Vacuum [later Mobil Corporation]) just steps away from Grand Central Terminal. Former Chief Judge of the New York State Court of Appeals (the highest appellate review court in the state) Judith Kaye, who is now of counsel to the law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, serves as NYIAC’s Chair.
NYIAC is an independent, nonprof it center, unaff ili- ated with any other organization, although it shares the floor with the International Center for Dispute Resolution of the American Arbitration Association. It is a world- class hearing space which aims to advance, strengthen and promote the conduct of international arbitration in New York and to promote New York as a pre-eminent site for the conduct of international arbitrations. The facilities are available for arbitrations administered by any institution, plus ad hoc arbitrations, such as SMA arbitrations, mediation proceedings, as well as a variety of conferences. Parties are free to use NYIAC for their hearings irrespective of the administering organization or specific arbitration rules such organizations impose,
making NYIAC an easily accessible “neutral space” for arbitrators, mediators, and neutrals alike, to meet and resolve disputes. It provides a neutral ground where par- ties can come to resolve their disputes, thereby allaying any misgivings that a party could feel in having such a proceeding conducted in the offices of an opponent.. The opening of this new Center brings additional energy to the SMA’s decades-long attempt to convince parties to choose New York as the arbitration site in their contracts.
The Center offers well-appointed hearing rooms, breakout rooms and other amenities to accommodate arbitrations or mediations of any size. It also has up-to- the minute technological capabilities including video and audio conferencing, simultaneous translation, large LCD monitors and projection screens and individual monitors for the arbitrators. One of its Hearing Rooms can com- fortably seat up to 43 attendees. Two other large hearing rooms can seat 23 or 18 people, respectively. The Center also has more intimate meeting rooms which seat up to 10, for smaller hearings or mediations. Special rates are available when these rooms are used as breakout rooms. The daily rental rate for hearing rooms ranges from $750 to $1,500.
Maritime arbitrations have traditionally been held in the office of one or the other of the attorneys’ represent- ing the parties to the matter. Sometimes such proceed- ings have taken place in one of the arbitrators’ offices, but there might be some cases, especially for very large proceedings involving many parties that may benefit by holding such hearings in a neutral space, such as NYIAC.
The opening of NYIAC is yet another inducement for parties to resolve their disputes in the United States, and specifically to choose New York as the seat of arbitra- tion. Federal law in the U.S. strongly favors arbitration, upholding arbitration clauses which reflect the desire of the parties to resolve their disputes outside of the court system. New York-based federal courts have been particularly supportive in this regard. New York is home to world-class arbitrators, mediators and attorneys, who are highly experienced in resolving international and maritime disputes. Moreover, New York is at the center of the world of finance and business, making it a natural choice for business-minded parties who want to resolve their conflicts as efficiently as possible.
1. Ms. Bulow is a past President of the Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc. and currently serves on its Board of Governors. She is also on the Panel of Neutrals at the International Centre for Dispute Resolution of the American Arbitration Association.
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TRADITIONAL TEST fOR SAfE PORT/ SAfE BERTh APPLIED BY ThE UNITED STATES COURT Of APPEALS fOR ThE ThIRD CIRCUIT. “DUE DILIgENCE” NOT IMPLIED OR READ INTO ThE WARRANTY. In rE LImItAtIon ProcEEdIng of frEscAtI shIPPIng (thE Athos I), 718 f.3D 184, 2013 AMC 1521 (3D CIR. 2013)
LeRoy Lambert*
For decades, disputes in the US concerning the war- ranty of a safe port/safe berth in a charter party have been handled almost exclusively by maritime arbitrators. It takes unusual facts and an extraordinary situation for such a dispute to reach the courts. However, the spill in 2004 from the Athos I in the Delaware River was unusual and extraordinary.
Approaching its berth at a terminal near Philadelphia in 2004, the tanker Athos I struck a submerged unmarked and uncharted anchor. The ship’s hull was punctured, and some 263,000 barrels spilled into the Delaware River. The cleanup operations cost approximately $180 million.
The ship was operating in a tanker pool under a Baltime form. Under that charter form, the time charterer (pool op- erator) was obliged to exercise “due diligence to ensure that the vessel is only employed between and at safe places.”
The pool operator had, however, chartered the ship out under an Asbatankvoy form which gave the voyage charterer the right to direct the ship to load and discharge at any safe place “provided the Vessel can proceed thereto, lie at, and depart therefrom always safely afloat.”
The voyage charterer was an affiliate of the owner of the terminal where the ship was to berth.
The courts had to decide who, as between the owner interests and the voyage charterer/terminal interests, had to bear the cost of the cleanup. The district court found that the owner interests bore the loss. The court of appeals reversed on the law and remanded for additional fact find- ing in the district court as to the ship’s draft.
The Proceedings
The district court ruled in favor of the voyage charterer and the terminal and dismissed the owner’s claim. Among other things, it held that the voyage charterer was obliged to exercise due diligence only in providing a safe berth/
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safe port and had done so. It also held that the anchor was submerged in an area outside the control of the affiliated terminal and the geographical scope of any such duty.
On appeal, in a decision issued 16 May 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit re- versed the district court’s decision and sent the case back to the district court for further factual findings with respect to the draft of the ship.
The Decision
The court affirmed the traditional rule here and in England that a port is safe when “the particular chartered vessel can proceed to it, use it, and depart from it without, in the absence of abnormal weather or other occurrences, being exposed to dangers which cannot be avoided by good navigation and seamanship.” The court aligned itself with other circuits including the Second Circuit: “We are per- suadedthattheSecondCircuit’slongstandingformulation of the safe berth clause is the one we should follow.” The court did not follow a 1990 decision by the Fifth Circuit in which that court held that a due diligence standard should be read into a charterer’s warranty of a safe berth/safe port.
The court acknowledged the importance of custom and the expectations of commercial parties in a specialized field: “That some forms explicitly adopt a due diligence standard suggests that the understood default is to impose liability on the charterer without regard to the care taken.”
Here, under the Baltime charter, the owner had agreed that the time charterer/pool operator need only exercise due diligence. The pool operator had, however, bargained for the full, traditional warranty in the Asbatankvoy voyage charter, and the voyage charterer had agreed to that risk. The owner, however, not the pool operator had suffered the physical damage to its ship and had incurred the cleanup costs. So, it was not enough for the court to endorse the traditional view to decide the case; it had to decide whether the owner was entitled to the benefit of the warranty which the pool operator had bargained for in the voyage charter, i.e., whether the owner was a third-party beneficiary of the warranty in the voyage charter. The district court had held that the owner was not a third-party beneficiary, finding no intent by the voyage charterer to benefit the ship owner.
After a thorough review of the caselaw, the court concluded that the voyage charter itself expressed suf- ficient intent: “Because the warranty [in the voyage charter] explicitly covers the safety of the vessel, it would be nonsensical to deprive the vessel’s owner the benefits of this promise, as the owner is ultimately the one most interested in the vessel’s status and is obligated to maintain its condition.”
©2013 Society of Maritime Arbitrators
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The voyage charterer further contended that the owner, by proceeding to a port in a range named in the charter, ac- cepted any risks of the port as to safety. The court, however, found that while this may be true of known objects, any such acceptance of risks did not include unknown risks, such as the submerged anchor in this case.
Also, the court had to consider the liability of the terminal owner under maritime tort law. It took a practi- cal view to defining the terminal owner’s duty to provide a safe approach noting that “when a ship transitions from its general voyage to a final, direct path to its destination, it is on an approach.” The submerged anchor was some 900 feet from the berth, in an area not under the direct control of the terminal, but between the main ship channel and the berth. The ship was 748 feet long.
In deciding the meaning of “approach,” the court con- sidered various analogies. One, which will likely stick, is to a driveway to one’s home. Some are shorter, some are longer. But when one turns into one’s driveway, one has, at the latest, begun the “approach” to home.
Conclusion
It remains to be seen whether the United States Su- preme Court will review the case, now or possibly after the district court’s decision on remand if it finds that the ves- sel’s draft was not an issue. There is clearly a split among the circuit courts of appeal on whether “due diligence” is to be read into the warranty. Such a split is a ground upon which the Court typically decides to take up a case.
*President, Charles Taylor P&I Management (Americas), Inc., New York
DIvIDED DAMAgES IN A SAfE BERTh CASE: ThE WESTWOOD ANETTE, SMA 4189 (2012)
Donald P. Murnane and Manuel A. Molina1
Late last year, a panel of experienced arbitrators tackled the interplay between unsafe berth conditions and navigational errors in determining the liability for a vessel’s allision with a mooring dolphin. The allision resulted in a vessel fuel tank being punctured and a release of fuel oil into the surrounding waters. THE WESTWOOD ANETTE, SMA 4189 (2012) (Sheinbaum, Berg, Martowski). A Panel
majority apportioned fault for the spill 50/50 between the owner and charterer.
While undocking from Berth 2 at Squamish, Brit- ish Columbia, on the afternoon of August 4, 2006, the WESTWOOD ANETTE drifted slightly out of position in moderate winds and lightly came to rest against a mooring dolphin fender located a short distance from the main dock face. The vessel was being navigated by an experienced compulsory pilot, assisted by two tugs supplied by the char- terer. The front of the concrete mooring dolphin was f itted with two fenders each consisting of a triangular cluster of three wood timber piles set within an “H-bracket” bolted to the concrete face of the dolphin. The outer pile served as a “sacrificial rubbing pile” and two inner piles were held by a transverse rod located in slots in the one-inch thick steel side plates of the H-bracket. A rubber cylinder was located within the throat of the H-bracket plates bearing against the two inner piles. The rubber cylinder served as a shock absorber against vessel contact. The timber cluster was designed to slide inward within the H-bracket and compress against the rubber cylinder; however, when the WESTWOOD ANETTE’s hull came in light contact with the timber fender, the right-angle steel corners of the H- Frame became exposed beyond the piles and pierced the ship’sside.Thesteelcornerspuncturedtwosmall“fanged” holes in the vessel’s starboard side bunker tank causing the spill. It was undisputed that the allision caused only cosmetic damage to the timber pile and no damage to the dolphin itself. Owner’s expert calculated that, at the time of contact, the vessel was moving at an estimated lateral speed of one foot every 8 seconds.
Owner commenced arbitration against charterer to recover oil pollution and clean up costs incurred in the aftermath of the accident. Owner contended that charterer had breached the safe berth warranty contained in the parties’ modified New York Produce Exchange form time charter agreement. Owner argued, inter alia, that the berth was unsafe because: (a) the tugs supplied by the time char- terer were inadequate and underpowered to assist the vessel during her undocking maneuvers; (b) the faulty H-bracket design of the fender of the dolphin constituted a latent haz- ard to navigation since such a design gave no warning of the risk to the vessel and concealed the fact that the vessel’s hull could be pierced in the event of light foreseeable con- tact. Charterer raised several defenses, including: (a) the safe berth warranty was a “limited” warranty because the parties had deleted the phrase “between safe ports/and or ports” from the Preamble of the NYPE charter party form; (b) even if the berth were unsafe, the sole proximate cause of the allision was the negligent navigation of the pilot and Master who had exclusive and ultimate responsibility for
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determining the adequacy of the tugs supplied and who should have avoided any contact with the dolphin through proper navigation and seamanship.
The Panel unanimously rejected the charterer’s argu- ment concerning a “limited” warranty, ruling that Clause 6 of the NYPE form, which contains the words “safely lie, always afloat,” constitute an express warranty of safe port and safe berth. The Panel split, however, on the issues of whether the berth was unsafe and whether the sole proxi- mate cause of the allision was the negligent navigation of the vessel.
In rejecting the argument that the pilot and Master had exclusive responsibility for determining the adequacy of the tugs’ horsepower, the Panel majority concluded that, under Clause 2 (which obligated charterer to pay for all port charges and pilotage) and Clause 6, the charterer had a “non-delegable” duty to provide adequate tug assistance for the vessel’s departure from Berth 2. The Panel majority found that the tug complement provided to the vessel for her undocking maneuvers was woefully inadequate and was a contributing cause of the allision. Although the majority was quick to point out that the pilot and the Master also bore some responsibility for properly evaluating the tugs’ adequacy, it nevertheless ruled that the “inadequacy of the tug package ... and the failure of [the charterer] to provide adequate tugs for the departure of the Vessel rendered the berth and the port unsafe.”
The majority similarly found that the H-bracket design of the dolphin’s fender rendered the berth unsafe, espe- cially given the inadequacy of the tug complement. The majority determined that the timber arrangement, which allowed the H-bracket sharp corners to come into contact with the vessel on light “barely touching” contact, was a hazardous condition. In addition, the majority also found that the fender’s faulty design was a latent or hidden danger that was not known or reasonably apparent to the vessel’s navigators. Accordingly, the majority ruled that the “unsafe design and condition, and latent or hidden danger of the fenders constituted a breach of [charterer’s] safe port, safe berth warranties, and was a contributing cause of the holing of the [vessel], and the resulting pollution.”
As to navigation, the majority found the pilot had failed to properly execute the standard unberthing maneuvers and that such navigational errors contributed 50% fault to the allision. In so doing, the majority expressly declined to ap- ply what it characterized as “The Eastern City exculpatory rationale,” an English law doctrine that exonerates a char- terer from liability if a casualty could have been avoided by the exercise of good navigation and seamanship. Ac- knowledging that The Eastern City rationale was a general rule of proximate causation, the majority emphasized the
6
rule “should not be applied without regard to the particular facts and circumstances of a given situation.” For the Panel majority there were two “extremely unusual” facts that prevented the rule’s application, namely, (a) the latent or hidden danger of the steel H-frame fender design which was not known or reasonably apparent to the vessel’s navi- gators, and (b) the grossly underpowered tugs that allowed the vessel to be in an area where she was most vulnerable to damage from the latent, hazardous danger posed by the steel corners of the H-bracket, which inadequacy prevented the pilot and Master from controlling the vessel to avoid even light contact with the fender.
The WESTWOOD ANETTE award illustrates that arbitrators in New York apply The Eastern City rule on a case-by-case, fact-intensive analysis, and, in appropri- ate situations, may apply a comparative fault analysis to apportion liability where unsafe berth conditions and navigational errors each contribute in proximately causing an accident.
1. Partners, Freehill Hogan & Mahar, New York.
SUPERSTORM SANDY RESURfACES IN COURT
By James E. Mercante*
Superstorm Sandy is now flooding the courts. Law- suits have been filed across the tri-state area by parties looking to recover for storm-related destruction to their property. Many lawsuits are by vessel owners—or against vessel owners, marinas and yacht clubs. The suits seek damages arising from the unprecedented storm surge that swept thousands of boats from their berths and from storage ashore.
The first known reported decision in New York con- cerning Superstorm Sandy is not a marine case (despite the proximity of the loss to navigable waters). But the analysis applied by Judge Philip S. Straniere in Pietrange- lo v. S&E Customize It Auto is relevant and informative. The complaint was filed in Richmond County Civil Court by the owner of a motor vehicle damaged by rising flood waters while stored inside a repair shop adjacent to the Kill Van Kull waterway on Staten Island.1 The decision is unusually comprehensive for a small claims dispute and see-worthy for its broader implications. Straniere even engaged in self-described “intellectual speculation” as to whether human activities could have contributed to
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changes in the atmosphere (i.e., global warming) “leading to altered patterns of more extreme weather” that made ‘Sandy’ into a ‘superstorm.’2
Bailment Meets Nature
A few days before the arrival of Sandy, plaintiff left his vehicle at the defendant’s shop for repairs. As the sea water rose to unexpected high levels during the storm, the facility flooded and the vehicle took on enough water to be declared a total loss. The auto insurer indemnified the owner of the car less the deductible. Not to be short- changed, the car owner sought to recover his out-of-pocket $1,000 deductible and filed suit against the repair shop.
Delivery of the vehicle to the garage for repairs created a “mutual benefit bailment” requiring the bailee (repair shop) to exercise that degree of care which a reasonably careful person in possession of similar goods would exer- cise under the same circumstances, an ordinary negligence standard.3 A rebuttable presumption of negligence arises when a bailee returns property in damaged condition or not at all.4 However, the “act of Nature” (which the court assumed to be ‘the politically correct modern equivalent of the common law for act of God’), refers to a natural occurrence over which humans have no control and were not involved in creating the occurrence.5
The court observed that Superstorm Sandy “caused the loss of life, resulted in billions of dollars of property dam- age, and caused the disruption of countless people’s lives.” The existence of such occurrences, Straniere noted, makes it “impossible for a human to be negligent and responsible for losses incurred.”6 Thus, the destruction (no matter what category the storm was when it made landfall) rose to the level of supporting an “act of Nature” defense.7
Insurance Obligation?
The vehicle owner also alleged that the facility should have obtained flood insurance to pay for losses to property in its care. In New York, there is no duty for a bailee to procure insurance for goods in its care and custody. How- ever, such a duty may be created by mutual agreement between the parties; a statute requiring such insurance; a showing of custom and usage in the industry; or by course of prior dealings between the parties.8 But, none of these existed and therefore the repair facility had no liability for not obtaining insurance for the vehicle in its possession.
The judge sua sponte raised a thought-provoking argument, to wit, whether the claimant could establish that he was the third-party beneficiary of any insurance requirements under the repair shop’s lease with its landlord.
For example, if the lease required tenant (repair shop) to obtain insurance for property in its possession, the vehicle owner could potentially benefit by same if the tenant could somehow be considered the third-party beneficiary of such insurance requirement.9 No evidence existed to support this argument, and the court concluded that defendant’s failure to have casualty or flood insurance for third-parties was not negligence.10
Act of god Defense
Back to admiralty. The act of God defense has been invoked in maritime cases involving hurricanes and other heavy weather occurrences since wind met sail. Courts have frequently considered the “act of God de- fense” in deciding marine casualty cases.11 The burden of proof of exercising reasonable precautions rests on the party asserting it, but not if the force of nature is of ‘catastrophic’ proportions, sufficient to overcome all reasonable preparations.12
The term has been defined in general maritime law as a disturbance of such unanticipated force and severity as would fairly preclude charging a party with responsibility occasioned by that party’s failure to guard against it in the protection of property committed to its custody.13
Many lawsuits have been filed for damage to property caused by vessels that broke free from their docks or floated away from shore due to Sandy’s hurricane-force winds and unprecedented tidal surge. When only a mooring is provided by a marina or yacht club, or the vessel owner otherwise has full access to the vessel, the relationship between the marina and the vessel owner is typically that of a lessor and lessee, not bailment.14 However, if a bail- ment is created, then the marina (or yacht club) will owe a duty of ordinary care to the boat owner, and there will be a rebuttable presumption of fault in case of loss or damage to the boat subject to the act of God defense. A bailment can be created when a vessel is held for repairs or long- term storage.15 But, when the vessel is berthed at a marina or yacht club for regular access by the vessel owner, and the marina does not have exclusive control over the boat, then a bailment is not created and the presumption of fault is not triggered.16
While initially there may be a “presumption of fault” operating against the vessel that causes damage, the vessel owner (yacht club or marina) will invoke the “act of God” defense and attempt to show that (i) the damage was solely caused by an extreme force of nature, and (ii) that the vessel owner (yacht club or marina) had acted reasonably under the circumstances. This defense applies as forcefully in the recreational boating context as it does in commercial ma-
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rine setting involving tugs, barges and ships. For example, a vessel owner was found not liable when its vessel broke free of a mooring during a hurricane because the damage was caused “solely by the extraordinary, unforeseeable, and catastrophic character of Hurricane Betsy, an Act of God.”17 It was found to be a storm of such magnitude as to overcome all reasonable precautions, a classic case of an act of God defense.18
A sampling of act of God defense cases, ‘successful’ and ‘unsuccessful,’ are discussed in a law review article by the author titled “Hurricanes and Act of God: When the Best Defense Is a Good Offense.”19
Conclusion
The first reported ruling on Superstorm Sandy damage offers a road map of how a court will evaluate the politi- cally correct “act of Nature” defense in cases resulting from damage caused by the “Storm of the Century.” It remains to be seen if Superstorm Sandy, also known as ‘Franken- storm,’ will fall into the category where courts will infer (as Judge Straniere did) that no reasonable preparations would have prevented damage.
*Partner, Rubin Fiorella & Friedman LLP, New York
1. Pietrangelo v. S&E Customize It Auto, 39 Misc.3d 1239(A), 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 50933(U), *1 (Civ. Ct., Richmond County 2013).
2. Id. *4.
3. Id. *2.
4. ICC Metals v. Municipal Warehouse, 50 N.Y.2d 657 (1980).
5. Pietrangelo *4.
6. Id. *4.
7. Id. *4.
8. Lehman v. Fischzang, 52 Misc.2d 80 (1966).
9. Pietrangelo, id. *3.
10. Id. *3.
11. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Hawaiian Eugenia, 966 F.2d 101, 103-04; 1993 AMC 43 (2d. Cir. 1992).
12. Mercante, James E., “Hurricanes and Act of God: When the Best Defense Is a Good Offense,” 18 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 1, 38- 39 (2005-2006).
13. Id.; Compania de Vapores Insco S.A. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 232 F2d 657, 660 (5th Cir. 1956).
14. Security National Ins. v. Sequoyah Marina, 246 F.2d 830, 1958 AMC 143 (10th Cir. 1957).
15. Stegelman v. Miami Beach Boat Slips, 213 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1954).
16. Royal Ins. v. Marina Industries, 34 Mass.App.Ct. 349 (1993).
17. Dammers & Van der Heide Shipping & Trading v. S.S. JOSEPH LYKES, 300 F.Supp. 358 (E.D. La. 1969), aff’d, 425 F.2d 991, 996 (5th Cir. 1970).
18. Id. 300 F.Supp. 358 at 366.
19. Mercante, James E., “Hurricanes and Act of God: When the Best Defense Is a Good Offense,” 18 U.S.F. March L.J. 1, 38-39 (2005-2006).
ThE NEW YORk PRODUCE EXChANgE
By Lucienne Carasso Bulow, Ph.D.1
Since 1643, when three vessels arrived at New Amster- dam from the West Indies to take on cargoes of wheat, “the commerce of America began,” writes E.R. Carhart who was President of the New York Produce Exchange in 1911.2 With its magnificent natural harbor, NewYork became the gateway of American commerce. Located at the mouth of the navigable Hudson River and its strategic proximity to Long Island Sound through the East River, New York was the geographic center of the thirteen colonies. Exports to Great Britain soon expanded, consisting of wheat, “Indian corn,” oats, rye, peas, barley, buckwheat, livestock, timber, lumber, flour, pork, fish, tobacco, milled goods as well as other commodities. As the de facto financial center of the country, New York had the resources and essential risk- takers to market such products far better and more cheaply than any of its domestic rivals. In 1658, the first depot in New Amsterdam was located on the present site of Bowling Green. The completion of the Erie Canal in 1825 increased NewYork’s stature as the commercial capital of the country. The development of Clipper ship service on a regularized schedule between New York and Europe helped satisfy the ever-growing demand for American foodstuffs. Goods and commodities coming from other parts of the country had to be transported, financed, inspected and stored in the great number of available warehouses in New York. Trading of products, bearing different delivery dates, were bought and sold until their ultimate delivery to the buyers. All these activities required the parallel development of commod- ity exchanges which would act as central marketplaces, where the latest information of commercial interest could be gathered and disseminated, and accurate and timely
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prices set. Trades would be regulated by clearing-houses of commerce. Such exchanges also led to additional liquidity and capital to come into the marketplace to the benefit of all stakeholders.
Several exchanges were formed and located along Broad Street and South Street. Eventually these became part of the Merchants’ Exchange, an emerging general commercial center that embraced all branches of trade. A building for the Merchants’ Exchange was erected in 1825 at 55 Wall Street. It fell victim to the Great Fire of 1835 but was rebuilt and enlarged in 1842 in Greek Revival style by architect Isaiah Rogers. The new building had a classical front of eighteen Ionic columns of Quincy granite, each thirty-eight feet high and four-and-a-half-feet in diameter. The Merchants’ Exchange failed in 1862, and the building was ultimately purchased by the U.S. government to house the U.S. Customs Service.3 A new corporation, known as the“NewYorkProduceExchangeCompany,”wasformed for the purpose of erecting a suitable building to house this entity on the block bounded by Water, Pearl, Whitehall and Moore Streets.4
A second body, known as the “New York Commercial Association,” a real exchange, was organized. On April 19, 1862, the New York Legislature granted it a broad and com- prehensive charter “to provide trading rules and regulations and to provide a suitable space for a Produce Exchange in the City of New York.” The 1862 Rules of the Association provided for arbitration by its Arbitration Committee. On February 13, 1868, the New York Legislature changed the name of the New York Commercial Association to “The New York Produce Exchange” (NYPE). Like its predeces- sor, the newly named Exchange established rules for the development of the highest standards of business practice and promulgated rules governing the trading of a single package to whole cargoes of wheat, corn, beef, pork, lard and flour seeds. Rules regulating transactions in oil (veg- etable oils, animal oils, mineral oils, cottonseed oil, olive oil) were adopted in 1877 and those for lighterage and trading in butter, cheese and hops followed between 1876 and 1901. In 1878, rules regulating the buying and selling of petroleum products, including crude, refined products and naphtha, were promulgated. The exchanges served to gather daily information concerning crops, the stocks of stored merchandise and commodities, the current world prices for all sorts of produce as well as the steamship trade.
The Exchange continued to grow rapidly in prestige and importance and, by 1878, its membership numbered 2,468.5 By 1881, its membership had grown so much that the NYPE erected a stately building at 2 Broadway on Bowling Green,6 returning to the place where trade had started centuries earlier. The Exchange began trading on
itshugenewtradingflooronMay6,1884,Ithadbecome a great marketplace. The main purpose of its Charter was
... to provide and regulate a suitable room or rooms for a Produce Exchange in the City of New York, to inculcate just and equitable principles in trade, to establish and maintain uniformity in commercial usages; to acquire, preserve and disseminate valuable business information, to adjust controversies and misunderstandings between persons engaged in business... .7
The Exchange’s Arbitration Committee played an impor- tant role. As described by Mr. Carhart:
... this committee has large powers in all matters submitted to it. It has the power to subpoena witnesses within certain districts, and all its decisions have the same force and power as a decision of the supreme court8, and upon proper filing and proving the clerk of the supreme court will issue a judgment thereon. The Arbitration Committee has always been held in high regard by the business world. It has been extensively used, and by its splendid service has done much to advertise and popularize arbitration as a means for the settlement of business differences.9
The Exchange also had a Complaint Committee to which trade differences not submitted by agreement to the specialized trade committees or to the Arbitration Com- mittee could be brought as a complaint.
The trade committees of the NYPE created general agreements with regard to warehousemen, railroad lines, steamship companies and other maritime interests covering
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the general needs of the trade. These agreements were put into forms of contracts, bills of lading and charter parties. Members could also trade in futures, which allowed them to hedge their financial risks trading in various products/ commodities.
Rules regulating the maritime trade, which concerned sailing ships, were adopted in 1880. Rules for the steamship trade followed in 1886. The NYPE also had a Maritime Ex- change,10 the rules of which provided for private arbitration dealing with NOR, laydays, demurrage and other relevant subjects. Clause 17 of The New York Produce Exchange Approved Grain Charter Party of 1897, amended January 1, 1899, provided that “this Charter Party is subject to the rules of the New York Produce Exchange and that all disputes arising at the port of loading shall be subject to arbitration at New York as therein provided.”11
On November 6, 1913, the New York Produce Ex- change issued an approved Time Charter “Produce Govern- ment Form”12 which was amended on October 20, 1921 and later in 1931 as well as 1946.13 The 1913 version contained some familiar language:
That should any dispute arise between Owners and the Charterers, the matter in dispute shall be referred to three persons at New York, one to be appointed by each of the parties hereto, and the third by the two so chosen; their decision or that of any two of them shall be final, and for the purpose of enforcing any award, this agreement may be made a rule of the Court.14
The Welsh Form Coal Charter Party of 1914 likewise contained a New York arbitration clause15 which read:
If any dispute or difference should arise under this clause, same to be referred to three parties in the City of New York, one to be appointed by each of the parties hereto, the third by the two so chosen and their decision, or any two of them shall be final and binding, and this agreement may, for enforcing the same, be made a rule of the Court.16
However, prior to 1920, arbitration awards could not be legally enforced, because neither New York State nor the U.S. Federal Government had adopted an arbitration statute. The New York State Arbitration Act was adopted in 1920 followed by the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act which was enacted in 1925. That Federal statute has allowed arbi- tral decisions made under maritime agreements to arbitrate to be enforceable nationwide. The Act, codified as U.S. Code Title 9 in 1947, has since been amended on seven different occasions and is the controlling law governing
10
those SMA arbitrations that are not expressly subject to the laws of a foreign jurisdiction. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 and the Inter-American Convention on Interna- tional Commercial Arbitration of 1975 which make part of U.S. Code Title 9, allow the worldwide enforcement of SMA awards.
The New York Produce Exchange eventually discontin- ued its trading operations, and its landmark building was demolished in 1957. The professional and ethical standards established by its Arbitration Committee were picked up and continue to be carried forward by the SMA since its founding in 1963.
The Trading Room of the Produce Exchange
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1.
time Arbitrators, Inc. (SMA).

Mrs. Bulow is a Past President of the Society of Mari-
2. E.R. Carhart, “The New York Produce Exchange.” An- nals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1911, Volume 38, No. 2, pp.206-221, Sage Publications, Inc. September 1911, p. 206.
3. After the Customs House Service moved in 1907 to its new building on Bowling Green, which was designed by architect Cass Gilbert, the Merchants’ Exchange building was purchased by the National City Bank. The interior and a second floor were later added in a remodeling overseen by architects McKim, Mead and White.
4. This was apparently the site of the old Custom House Bridge Market. The building was completed in 1861.
5. Carhart, p. 214.
6. It was an enormous red terra-cotta-and-brick Roman- esque Revival building which was 120 feet high with a tower rising to a height of 225 feet. It had a stained glass skylight overhead which covered an area equal to one-fifth of an acre. The New York Produce Exchange building at 2 Broadway was
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torn down in 1957. According to the AIA Guide to New York City by Norval White & Elliot Willensky, Fourth Edition, NY: Three Rivers, 2000, the Produce Exchange Building, whose architect was George B. Post, was one of the city’s greatest architectural losses in the post-World War II years. p. 12
7. Report of the New York Produce Exchange from July 1, 1886 to July 1, 1887: Charter, By Laws by the Exchange and a List of its Members. New York: Press of De Leeuw, Oppenheimer & Myers, 108 & 110 Duane St., 1887, p. 111.
8. The State Supreme Court is the lowest court in the New York State court system.
9. Carhart, p. 220.
10. ThiswasaccordingtoanarticlepublishedinTheNew

York Times on September 22, 1901.
11. Wharton Poor, American Law of Charter Parties and Ocean Bills of Lading, Second Edition, Albany: Matthew Bender & Company, 1930, Appendix D1.
12. In subsequent revisions, the title was amended to “Gov- ernment Form.”
13. In the revisions of the New York Produce Exchange Time Charter which were made in 1981 and , the arbitration clause was substantially changed to give the option of London arbitration.
14. PooronCharterParties,AppendixC1.Thearbitration clause in the 1913 Time Charter Party is Clause 18. In the 1921, 1931 and 1946, the arbitration clause is Clause 17. Interestingly enough, in future revisions and certainly in the 1946 revision, the words “the arbitrators shall be commercial men” was added.
15. Although not a New York Produce Exchange Charter Party, the Coal Welsh Form C/P of 1914 (the antecedent to the Americanized Welsh Coal Charter “Amwelsh”) showed a con- sistent approach by the merchants and shipping people of the time regarding arbitration in New York.
16. Poor on Charter Parties, Appendix E
IN MEMORIAM
Sadly, Jeremy Harwood and George Chandler, two stalwarts of the maritime bar and arbitration community passed away since our last edition. We mourn their passing and celebrate their lives and careers.
REMEMBRANCE Of
JEREMY J.O. hARWOOD
[abridged version of remarks at memorial service on August 7, 2013]
By John D. kimball*
The first part of Jeremy’s legal career was with Healy & Baillie, a relatively small maritime law firm, where he initially worked as an associate. Jeremy quickly rose to become a partner in Healy & Baillie and remained there until Oct 1, 2006, when he joined Blank Rome along with many other HB partners.
Jeremy was widely recognized as an outstanding mari- time lawyer. In recent years, Jeremy was best known for his work in maritime bankruptcy, a field in which he was a renowned expert. Jeremy’s work in this area began in the early days of his career at Healy & Baillie, when he assisted in two major cases involving the bankruptcies of US Lines and Lykes Lines. We were confronted in those cases with the task of handling tens of thousands of asbestos claims, many of which were outright frauds. Jeremy took to this with great tenacity, like a dog chasing a bone. Jeremy made enormous contributions to the successful handling of what was clearly a very complex problem. By the time of his death, Jeremy was handling several of the most important maritime bankruptcy cases and was a leading light in this area of practice.
For several years, Jeremy was listed in the highly respected International Who’s Who in the Law as one of the ten most highly regarded individuals in shipping law worldwide. In 2012, a leading shipping publication rated Jeremy as one of Shipping’s 100 most influential people.
What was it about Jeremy that made him so successful as a maritime lawyer?
First, as all of us know, Jeremy could be an incredibly charming and engaging person. When Jeremy arrived anywhere, his arrival was something more: it was an en- trance –an appearance – whatever the occasion, it was no longer ordinary. When Jeremy was in the room, you knew he was there. Jeremy always was a standout at cocktail parties and social events, where he had an amazing ability to work the crowd.
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Jeremy was successful also because he worked very hard to develop a vast knowledge of maritime law. Jeremy knew the facts of his cases inside/out and also was a true expert in maritime law, a field mined with all sorts of ar- cane legal doctrines which he savored and mastered. The more arcane, the more interesting it was to Jeremy.
Third, he had a quick mind and the ability to get to the heart of the problem very directly. He was creative and saw lines of attack or defense which others did not immediately see.
Most important, if you were Jeremy’s client, you know he would be loyal, zealous and tenacious in representing you. How strongly can I put it. Jeremy was an admirer of Winston Churchill, and I think that one of Churchill’s most famous speeches describes very well the approach Jeremy took in representing his clients. Obviously, in my plain American accent, I cannot convey this as well as Jeremy could have done. Churchill was speaking to the students at his alma mater, the Harrow School, in 1941, in the early part of WW 2, and he said:
Never give in, never give in, never, never, never, never – in nothing, great or small, large or petty – never give in, except to convictions of honour and good sense!
I can think of many cases and occasions when Jeremy lived and breathed this approach and his clients benefitted from his doing so. We will honor Jeremy by trying to live by these famous words.
*Partner, Blank Rome LLP, New York
gEORgE f. ChANDLER III
George F. Chandler III, 72, passed away on May 23, 2013, in Houston, Texas. Born and raised in Winthrop, Mass., George moved from the Boston area to Maplewood, N.J., in 1975, and to Houston in 1996. A descendant of Nova Scotia shipbuilders, it is no surprise that George had a great passion for ships and the sea. He was a great- great-grandson of master shipbuilder Donald MacKay, who is best known for building the fastest clipper ships ever built, in his East Boston Shipyards. After completing high school in 1958, George went to Virginia Polytechnic Institute on a scholarship from the Boston Naval Yard. He graduated in 1963 with a co-op degree in architecture and marine engineering, and was then commissioned by the U.S. Navy, eventually serving as a naval adviser in
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Vietnam in 1966 to 1967. George graduated from Suffolk University Law School in 1972 and joined the maritime law practice of Bigham Englar Jones & Houston in New York. He joined Hill Rivkins LLP in 1978. In 1996, he moved to Houston as the managing partner of Hill Rivkins’ Houston office. George specialized in maritime and com- mercial litigation. He was admitted to the state and federal courts of New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts and Texas, as well as various federal appellate courts, including the United States Supreme Court, to which he was admitted in 1977. He was designated by the U.S. State Department to serve as the US Representative to the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) for eCommerce from 1992 to 1994, and as adviser until 2002. George was involved in many professional organizations, including the Maritime Law Association; he was a titular member of the Comite Maritime International, the ABA, and the New York City Bar Association. George’s love of the sea and ships continued into his retirement with cruises all over the world on both passenger and merchant vessels and his appreciation of lighthouses and puffins.
ThE SMA AT 50! klaus C.J. Mordhorst
As mentioned at the beginning of this issue of The Ar- bitrator by President Warfield, the SMA commemorates its 50th Anniversary with a festive black-tie Dinner Dance on Friday November 22, 2013, at the spectacular Model Room of the New York Yacht Club at 37 West 44th Street in New York.
A cocktail reception at 6:30 PM in the Grill Room will be followed by an elegant Dinner in the legendary Model Room. The Peter Duchin Orchestra will provide the entertainment. All are welcome and we hope to see you there to celebrate this memorable anniversary with us.
The Dinner Dance will be preceded on Thursday, No- vember 21 at 9:00 AM, by a timely and provocative seminar on the very current subject of ship vetting.
The subject, “FAIR AND BALANCED SHIP VET- TING : A FACT, GOAL OR ILLUSION,” will be presented and discussed by an international panel of prominent maritime professionals. The seminar will take place at the Great Hall of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, at 42 West 44th Street, New York (directly across the street from the New York Yacht Club), followed by a luncheon at the New York Yacht Club. This Seminar is bound to attract large interest and it would be advisable to make reservations early.
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©2013 Society of Maritime Arbitrators
VOLUME 44 | NUMBER 1 | NOVEMBER 2013
THE ARBITRATOR
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Full details for both events are posted on the SMA website at www.smany.org or you may contact Patricia Leahy at the SMA office at 212.344 2400.
EDITORS NOTE
This is the debut issue of The Arbitrator under new editors. The Arbitrator has a long history of providing
timely and relevant articles and information to the mari- time arbitration community in New York and around the world. We look forward to continuing that tradition. To do so, however, requires your support and input. If you have articles and ideas to contribute to future editions, please let us know. Also, we welcome your feedback on each and every issue. Please do not hesitate to contact us, rshaw@ mystrasventures.com or leroy.lambert@ctplc.com, and thank you for your support.
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THE ARBITRATOR
Robert G. Shaw, Editor
rshaw@mystrasventures.com
LeRoy Lambert, Associate Editor
leroy.lambert@ctplc.com
Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc. 30 Broad Street, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10004-2402 (212) 344-2400 • Fax: (212) 344-2402

E-mail: info@smany.org Website: http://www.smany.org
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The views expressed in the articles in this publication are those of the authors alone and do not represent the views of the editors or The Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc.
©2013 Society of Maritime Arbitrators
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